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T
he Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (the TRIPS 
Agreement, Box 1) has to a large 
extent harmonized standards for 
intellectual property rights, including 
patents. For many countries, the 
TRIPS standards were higher than 
their previous standards. For example, 
TRIPS obliges countries to allow 
patenting of pharmaceuticals and 
imposes a minimum duration of 20 
years for patents. Before TRIPS entered 
into force, a number of (developing) 
countries either did not grant patents 
for medicines, or had a shorter patent 
term. Since generic medicines can only 
be marketed in the absence of a patent 
or after its expiry, the implementation 
of TRIPS in those countries means 
it will take longer before generic 
versions of new medicines can enter 
the market. The TRIPS Agreement 
has therefore been criticized for its 
anticipated detrimental effect on access 
to medicines, especially in developing 
countries.
But while much of the debate on 
TRIPS, intellectual property rights, 
and access to medicines has focused 
on patents (Box 2), largely outside 
the limelight the rather abstract 
notion of data exclusivity has quietly 
been introduced and promoted. Data 
exclusivity refers to the granting of 
exclusive rights over the data required 
for registration of pharmaceuticals, 
notably the clinical and preclinical 
trial data. Data exclusivity, too, can 
jeopardize access to medicines and 
negatively affect public health. This 
article tries to demystify the concept 
and implications of “data exclusivity,” 
and to provide an overview of current 
trends.
Scrutinizing TRIPS
It has at times been argued that a 
relatively obscure clause in the TRIPS 
Agreement—namely its Article 39.3—
requires countries to implement data 
exclusivity [1,2]. However, careful 
reading of the article does not warrant 
this conclusion. Article 39.3 essentially 
demands that undisclosed registration 
data about new chemical entities be 
protected against unfair commercial 
use and against disclosure. Thus, in 
line with standard regulatory practice, 
authorities may not publish or share 
such data—though, importantly, TRIPS 
does not prevent disclosure when it is 
necessary to protect the public.
Discussions about data exclusivity, 
however, gravitate around the 
interpretation of “unfair commercial 
use” of registration data. Before 
registering a pharmaceutical product 
and allowing it on the market, 
regulatory authorities verify its quality, 
safety, and efﬁ  cacy. In the case of a 
new medicine, safety and efﬁ  cacy are 
established via preclinical and clinical 
trials; hence submission of the trial 
data is an important prerequisite for 
registration.
Meanwhile, in order to obtain 
marketing authorization for their 
products, generic manufacturers 
have to submit their own data on 
quality. In addition, they usually 
have to demonstrate that their 
product is chemically and biologically 
equivalent to the original. When 
those requirements are satisﬁ  ed, the 
regulatory authority will normally 
assume that the efﬁ  cacy and safety 
proﬁ  les of both products are the same, 
and on that basis allow marketing of 
the generic. Thus, while it could be 
argued that generic manufacturers 
indirectly rely on the originator’s safety 
and efﬁ  cacy data, such manufacturers 
do not use the originator’s data—in 
fact they do not even have access to 
them.
The regulatory body relies on 
the originator’s data, but normally 
does not actually use or revisit them. 
Moreover, even if the regulatory body 
would use those data, this would not 
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Box 1: TRIPS and TRIPS-Plus
The TRIPS Agreement harmonizes 
standards for various types of intellectual 
property rights, such as copyrights, 
patents, and trademarks. TRIPS is an 
integral part of the WTO Agreements, 
which create binding obligations 
among WTO member countries. TRIPS is 
subject to the WTO’s dispute settlement 
mechanism, which may—as a last 
resort—allow WTO member countries 
to apply trade sanctions against a 
noncompliant country. This is a powerful 
enforcement mechanism, especially vis-
à-vis developing countries, which can 
usually ill afford to be faced with trade 
sanctions.
Meanwhile, intellectual property 
protection that surpasses the standards 
and requirements of the TRIPS 
Agreement is often referred to as “TRIPS-
plus.” There are many different TRIPS-
plus provisions. For example, patent 
term extensions enable prolongation 
of the patent term beyond the 20 
years required by TRIPS, under certain 
circumstances. Data exclusivity and 
“linkage” (see text) are other TRIPS-plus 
provisions. These TRIPS-plus provisions 
all delay or hamper generic competition.PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0207
be commercial use—though such use 
could, indirectly, have commercial 
implications. Finally, it does not seem 
justiﬁ  ed to suddenly label longstanding 
regulatory practices as “unfair.”
Recently the independent 
Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights, Innovation and Public Health, 
established by the World Health 
Organization, also found that Article 
39.3 does not create property rights 
over registration data, nor does it 
amount to data exclusivity [3]. This 
interpretation is further supported by 
the article’s negotiating history [4].
Exclusivity Examined
Although data exclusivity is not 
mandated by TRIPS, the European 
Union (EU), the United States, and 
a few other countries have chosen 
to provide for data exclusivity 
domestically, and are encouraging 
other countries to follow suit [2,5]. 
Therefore it is important to be aware of 
its implications.
Data exclusivity essentially prevents 
regulatory authorities from relying on 
data submitted by originator companies 
in order to register a generic product. 
By implication, as long as the exclusivity 
lasts, generic producers would have to 
submit their own safety and efﬁ  cacy 
data. This would oblige them to 
repeat clinical and preclinical trials—
something that takes time and that 
they usually cannot afford. But more 
importantly, the repetition of clinical 
trials raises serious ethical questions, 
since it would imply withholding 
medicines that are already known to 
be effective from some patients (the 
control group), solely for commercial 
purposes. It is unlikely that withholding 
medicines in this way this would 
pass the scrutiny of ethical review 
committees, which renders it de facto 
impossible for generic companies to 
repeat the clinical trials.
Alternatively, generic manufacturers 
would have to postpone the launch 
of their product until the end of the 
exclusivity period. Thus, data exclusivity 
can delay generic competition and the 
ensuing price reductions.
From the perspective of public 
health and enhancing access to 
medicines, another troublesome 
feature of data exclusivity is its potential 
interference with a compulsory license. 
A compulsory license is a license, 
granted by the government (without 
the agreement of the patent holder) 
to allow third parties to produce 
generic versions of a product that is still 
under patent. Compulsory licensing 
is an important safeguard-mechanism 
in TRIPS. Yet data exclusivity could 
prevent the registration—and hence 
the actual sale and use—of generics 
produced under a compulsory license 
(see Box 3) [6].
The duration of data exclusivity is 
usually shorter than patent protection; 
therefore data exclusivity is most 
relevant when a product has not been 
patented in a particular country, or 
when patents can be challenged or 
circumvented (Box 4).
It is also relevant when a new use 
or indication is found for an existing 
medicine whose patent has expired, 
or is about to expire, since, in order 
to obtain permission to market a drug 
for a novel indication, new clinical 
trial data need to be submitted to the 
regulatory authority. Registration for 
a new indication could trigger a new 
period of exclusivity. Meanwhile, patent 
laws may not permit the patenting of 
such a “new indication” (although this 
is allowed in some jurisdictions). Thus, 
data exclusivity acquires considerable 
commercial signiﬁ  cance against the 
backdrop of disappointing levels of 
discovery and development of new 
drugs [7–9] and of the struggle by drug 
companies to extend exclusivity of 
their top-selling products. According 
to one commentator: “Drug companies 
have learned that when they can’t 
create a new drug to treat an existing 
illness, they can create a new illness to 
treat with existing drugs” [10]. Data 
exclusivity, in other words, provides a 
mechanism that can be used to stave off 
generic competition.
Options for Damage Control
Faced with incessant demands, some 
countries have opted to provide data 
exclusivity, while trying to mitigate 
its negative impact on their domestic 
industries and on access to medicines. 
They have devised several strategies for 
damage control.
Limiting the duration of data 
exclusivity, and/or specifying that 
Box 2: Patents, Registration, 
and Marketing of Medicines
The pharmaceutical market is 
highly regulated. Two sets of laws and 
regulations play a crucial role in shaping 
this market: the intellectual property laws 
and the laws and regulations pertaining 
to drug registration. Intellectual property 
rights, especially patents, confer negative 
rights: if a particular medicine is under 
patent, the patent holder can prevent 
others from producing or selling (generic 
versions of) that medicine in the country 
concerned. But a patent does not give 
the patent holder the right to put that 
medicine on the market. In order to be 
allowed on the market, a medicine has 
to be registered by the national drug 
regulatory authority.
Moreover, a patent applies to an 
invention, not to a medicine per se. 
Patents can be granted for instance for 
a new chemical entity, a production 
process, or a particular formulation. 
Thus, a single medicine can be covered 
by more than one patent. Some patents 
(notably those on the chemical entity) 
completely block generics. But in other 
cases it may be possible to produce a 
generic version without infringing the 
patent, e.g., a tablet would not infringe 
a patent that only covers liquid dosage 
forms. Box 3: Avian Flu and Data 
Exclusivity in Europe
In the face of a possible pandemic 
of avian ﬂ  u, combined with 
insufﬁ  cient stockpiles of the “ﬂ  u drug” 
oseltamivir and a global demand 
that was signiﬁ  cantly exceeding the 
production capacity, questions have 
been raised in the EU about the role 
of generic production. The laws of EU 
member states contain provisions for 
compulsory licensing, which could be 
used to allow production of a generic 
version of a patented medicine. But 
European legislation does not provide 
for exceptions to the data exclusivity 
period following registration of a new 
medicine. Thus, even if a compulsory 
license were issued during that period, 
generic production and marketing would 
not be allowed, unless the manufacturer 
conducted its own preclinical tests 
and clinical trials. Alternatively, the 
originator would have to agree to the 
generic competitor’s reliance on its data. 
European ofﬁ  cials have stated that they 
can not waive these requirements, not 
even in the case of an emergency or 
outbreak [52].
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data exclusivity cannot extend beyond 
the patent term. The latter strategy 
was, until recently, explicitly provided 
for under EU regulations, and was 
implemented by Greece, Portugal, and 
Spain [11,12].
Limiting the scope of data 
exclusivity. This can be done by 
specifying explicitly that data exclusivity 
will only apply to new chemical entities 
and will not extend to new indications 
or different formulations of existing 
medicines. This strategy has been 
adopted by Egypt and Chile [13,14].
Imposing quick registration of a 
medicine. Chile has drafted regulations 
specifying that failure to register a new 
medicine in Chile within one year after 
obtaining the ﬁ  rst global marketing 
authorization will disqualify it for data 
exclusivity [14].
Creating procedures for 
“compulsory licensing” of the data that 
fall under the exclusive rights. This 
strategy draws on US practices in case 
of mergers [6] and on the examples of 
Costa Rica and Brazil [13].
Enabling health authorities to 
waive data exclusivity when it is 
deemed in the interest of public 
health or of speciﬁ  c patients to do 
so. This strategy is analogous to the 
registration waivers or “compassionate 
use” provisions that often ﬁ  gure in 
national rules on drug registration—
Colombia reportedly takes this line 
[13]. Waiving data exclusivity is also 
the approach followed by the EU in 
the case that a compulsory license 
is issued to allow the production of 
generic pharmaceuticals for export 
to countries that lack production 
capacity [15].
In other cases, regulators do not rely 
on the originator’s conﬁ  dential safety 
and efﬁ  cacy data when registering 
a generic medicine. Instead, they 
rely on published data or on foreign 
registration of the medicine concerned 
—Argentina for instance has been 
said to use the latter approach [1]. 
In fact, referring to or relying on 
foreign registration is a longstanding, 
recommended practice, especially for 
regulatory authorities with limited 
(human) resources [16–20].
Finally, there have been proposals to 
allow use of clinical trial data by generic 
competitors on a cost-sharing basis. 
Cost-sharing would prevent the creation 
of new monopoly rights, but instead 
enable competition in return for a fair, 
and probably modest, compensation to 
the originator of the data [13].
Bilateral Agreements: 
Preemptive Strikes?
Meanwhile, on the trade front, 
countries are increasingly turning 
to bilateral and regional free trade 
negotiations. At the instigation of 
their well-established pharmaceutical 
industry [21–23], some developed 
countries are using these negotiations 
to obtain protection for intellectual 
property that goes signiﬁ  cantly beyond 
the TRIPS standards. Data exclusivity 
ﬁ  gures prominently among those 
“TRIPS-plus” requirements (Box 1).
A comparison of bilateral free trade 
agreements (FTAs) that have been 
concluded in recent years between the 
US and an array of other countries 
demonstrates a worrisome trend: the 
requirements for data exclusivity are 
progressively getting tighter (Table 1). 
FTAs also increasingly preclude the use 
of the strategies for damage control 
discussed above.
In line with the tendency to seek 
ever more detailed and stringent data 
exclusivity concessions in FTAs, shown 
in Table 1, Thailand reportedly is 
facing extensive demands in this area 
during its bilateral trade negotiations 
with the US [24–26]. Moreover, 
Thailand risks being faced with 
similar demands during concurrent 
negotiations with the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) [27]. This 
risk is not imaginary, since the EFTA 
Box 4: Affecting Access to 
Antiretrovirals
In China, one of the key ﬁ  rst-line 
antiretrovirals for treatment of HIV/
AIDS is protected by process patents, 
which can be circumvented. There is no 
molecular patent that would completely 
block generic production, and Chinese 
manufacturers reportedly are producing 
the active pharmaceutical ingredient (or 
raw material) for export. But because of 
“administrative protection” (the Chinese 
equivalent of data exclusivity), these 
companies are not allowed to market the 
ﬁ  nal product (tablets) to patients inside 
China that need them [53].
Meanwhile in Guatemala, where most 
antiretrovirals are not under patent, 
Médecins Sans Frontières is treating AIDS 
patients mostly with generic medicines. 
Their considerably lower prices (5%–50% 
of the price of originator products) have 
made it possible to expand access to 
ﬁ  rst line treatment. However, Médecins 
Sans Frontières has expressed concern 
that recently enacted data exclusivity 
provisions will preclude the use of generic 
versions of newer antiretrovirals such as 
atazanavir, and could thus render second-
line treatment unaffordable [54,55].
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Table 1. Overview of Data Exclusivity Provisions in Recent US FTAs
Exclusivity provisions 
include/apply to:
2000 April – September 2003 May – September 2004 January – April 
2006
Vietnam Laos Singapore Chile Australia Morocco CAFTA Bahrain Oman Peru
New chemical entities (NCEs) (+) + + + + + + + + +
New indications (+) (+) (+) + + + +
When relying on foreign registration  + + + + + + +
When relying on disclosed data + + + + +
Exclusivity period can surpass patent term + + + + +
“Local” deﬁ  nition of NCEs to be used + + + + + +
Imposing quick registration prohibited ++
Symbols: + means the FTA imposes this particular requirement or condition; (+) means the language is ambiguous but may impose the requirement.
Data are based on the author’s assessment; they do not represent a legally binding or ﬁ  nal interpretation.
Time periods refer to the date on which the texts were ﬁ  nalized, not to the ratiﬁ  cation or entry into force of the respective agreements.
CAFTA, Central American Free Trade Agreement
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has already concluded several other 
free trade agreements that contain 
“TRIPS-plus” provisions, including data 
exclusivity [28–30].
Perhaps even more disturbing 
are suspicions that the EU may be 
attempting to include requirements 
for European-style data exclusivity in 
its Economic Partnership Agreements 
[31,32]; the EU already expects data 
exclusivity from new and aspirant 
member states [33,34]. EU-style data 
exclusivity lasts longer and hence 
could impede access to medicines even 
more seriously than US-type provisions 
(Box 5).
Blurring the Boundaries
The boundaries between the 
registration system and the intellectual 
property system are further blurred 
by requirements that the regulatory 
authority should withhold registration 
of generic versions of patented drugs. 
This is often referred to as “linkage.” 
Currently generic companies are free 
to make their own assessment as to 
whether a patent would stand up to 
legal scrutiny; when they consider a 
patent weak, generic manufacturers 
may decide to enter the market 
regardless.
“Linkage” renders the regulatory 
authority de facto responsible for 
enforcing pharmaceutical patents. 
When implementing it, regulators—
having neither the expertise, the 
resources, nor the mandate to assess 
the validity of a patent—will probably 
enforce any and all patents. This 
is problematic; in the US, generic 
companies have regularly prevailed in 
pharmaceutical patent infringement 
cases [35], meaning that in those cases 
the patent was either not infringed or 
not valid.
Thus, making registration 
conditional upon the absence of a 
patent will create additional barriers 
for generic manufacturers. It will 
also redouble the incentives for 
“evergreening”: the practice of ﬁ  ling 
additional and at times frivolous 
patents on minor improvements, or 
even simply on particular features 
of existing medicines, in an effort 
to keep generic competition at bay. 
Unfortunately—though perhaps 
not surprisingly—virtually all recent 
bilateral FTAs concluded by the US 
contain clauses mandating “linkage” 
between registration and patent status.
Accidents on Accession?
As if the above is not troubling enough, 
another worrisome trend has started 
to emerge: “TRIPS-plus” requirements 
are being imposed during World 
Trade Organization (WTO) accession 
negotiations. While initially appearing 
to be an incident unique to the 
accession of China [36], more recently, 
acceptance of tightly worded provisions 
on data exclusivity seems to have 
become a rather routine precondition 
for aspiring WTO members.
The ﬁ  rst indication that this 
precondition was becoming more 
common was the reference to data 
exclusivity during Cambodia’s accession 
[37]. The alarm bells that sounded 
when this fact became known [38-40] 
apparently were heard, and during the 
formal acceptance of Cambodia’s WTO 
membership, reference was made to 
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health [41], 
by virtue of which Cambodia would be 
able to defer the implementation of 
data protection.
But all this was quickly forgotten 
thereafter; similar “TRIPS-plus” 
commitments have surfaced during the 
recent accession of Tonga [42]. Data 
exclusivity has also been raised during 
the accessions of Saudi Arabia and 
Vietnam [43,44], and there are reports 
and fears that “TRIPS-plus” concessions 
are being asked of Russia [45], which 
is actively negotiating its way into the 
WTO.
Moreover, there appears to be little 
mercy for the small or the weak: the 
accession documents of Cambodia (a 
least-developed country) and Tonga 
(a small paciﬁ  c island nation) not only 
contain obligations with regard to data 
exclusivity, but also explicitly impose 
“linkage”—a feature that thus far is 
unique to the accession of small or 
least-developed countries.
Stemming the Tide?
Table 1 shows how FTAs are 
increasingly used to micromanage 
other countries’ domestic policies. 
WTO accession negotiations risk 
becoming an extension of this strategy. 
These trends beg the question of what 
competition in the pharmaceutical 
sector will look like in the future, and 
create serious concerns about the 
prospects for access to medicines, 
especially in developing countries.
But maybe all is not yet lost. The 
Southern African Customs Union 
has not yet caved in to “TRIPS-plus” 
demands in bilateral negotiations 
with both the US and EFTA [46–51]. 
Meanwhile, the emerging trend 
of making use of WTO accession 
negotiations to advance the ”TRIPS-
plus” agenda—which goes against 
the spirit of the Doha Declaration 
on TRIPS and Public Health—can 
probably still be nipped in the bud, 
if current WTO members recognize 
what is happening and take a common 
stance against the few demanders.
But more countries should resist 
demands that monopolize the use 
of clinical trial data and blur the 
boundaries between the intellectual 
property regime and regulatory 
requirements for pharmaceuticals. 
And the health sector should pay 
more attention to these developments 
outside its immediate purview, wake 
up to the far-reaching implications 
of these developments, and voice 
its concerns more widely and more 
effectively. Failing that, the battle for 
access to medicines will be lost on these 
new and little-known fronts.  
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